I had suggested, in effect, turning a lane in each direction on the LIE in Queens into a Quickway, or just an express busway, for exactly the reason you gave -- bus riders could get picked up over a wide catchment area then ride express to a central location, rather than take a local bus to the train in an outlying location.

In the Queens case, however, the buses would face congestion on the crossings to Manhattan, and in Manhattan, jacking up the cost. I had suggested a crossing in Long Island City Queens, one or two stops from Manhattan on the subway, and a transfer there.

Because the 63rd Street Tunnel was built with the intention of additional subway lines being built in Queens, the borough of 2.2 million has more subway capacity across the river to Manhattan than inside it. The busway would then allow the entire borough to connect to subway lines to points throughout Manhattan, with one transfer.

I think the closest thing we have to a "Quickway" as you describe it is the Lincoln Tunnel Exclusive Bus Lane, which does many of the things you describe, with many of the benefits, although it has many flaws as well.

In my series on BRT, I've described ways that we can implement similar infrastructure-focused improvements in the New York area. Right now there are bus terminals at many of the East River Bridges, but they're on the wrong side of the bridge from the jobs. If we allow those buses to cross the bridges, either to terminals or to through-running corridors, without mixing with car traffic so they can turn around quickly, we can eliminate the need to transfer to a subway with relatively little added driver time. If we provide dedicated routes to and from those bridges, we gain even more efficiency.

I'd like to offer a few observations, though, based on some of the comments here.

1. We offer a very precise definition of a Quickway in my study. If it does not meet this definition (such as Pittsburgh's busways), it is not a Quickway, but a busway.

2. Derek suggests that San Diego's I-15 is a Quickway; it most certainly is not, and in fact was strongly criticized by an independent Peer Review Panel which SANDAG had commissioned to review its transit planning. Quickways are specially-designed facilities on which only specially-trained drivers are permitted. I-15's managed lanes are open to a wide range of auto traffic. What's more, stations on the I-15 are located off-corridor, forcing buses to make significant out-of-direction detours (and pass through traffic signals); as a result, travel times for buses are not projected to be competitive with auto travel, even for trips actually beginning at a station (as opposed to most trips, which begin off-corridor). Also, Quickways are designed to maximize the linkage between stations and key land uses; stations on the I-15 offer little in the way of integration with land uses.

3. Several people question the cost and necessity of full grade-separation. Yes, it is indeed expensive, but the best global example right now is Brisbane, Australia, which has been building fully grade-separated Quickways, not because they're rich, but because an intelligently-designed system is very cost-effective. Unlike rail systems, which tend to serve mostly the areas within, say, half a mile on either side of the line (less in some environments), a single Quickway can support a set of branching services that express out of a major employment zone, then peel off to operate as "regular" BRT, express bus, or even local bus service along perpindicular and parallel arterials, extending the value of the investment to much large catchment zones.

4. To answer Nick Peterson, it is precisely for the preceding reason that one deploys Quickways: one pulls in a large number of express and local services into a central Quickway spine; the sheer volume of bus operations creates the warrant for grade separation. In Brisbane, the busiest segments of Quickways support between 200 and 300 bus operations per hour. In contrast, the Orange Line in LA can support perhaps 24 bus operations per hour before the signal priority system begins to break down.

5. To those who would question the costs and feasibility of "all those buses," the experience of Brisbane is critical. Since most buses fill up off corridor--before they even arrive at the Quickway--the decision was made to just run them pretty much straight into their downtown (with very few intermediate stops); after all, why force people to transfer from one bus to another, especially if the first one was already full? And as to why not have them transfer to a train, the answer was also simple: they have an extensive train network, but people found the direct buses much, much faster than taking the bus to the train (as well as inherently more reliable and less stressful). So the network structure has a direct bearing on how many passengers you attract to the system (Brisbane has seen a 40% growth in system ridership in 3 years due in great part to its new Quickway system)--but they also saw that the vast improvement in travel speeds meant that they could provide much more service with a given size fleet (when a round trip that took two hours now takes less than 40 minutes, you can operate three round trips with the same bus that previously made only one), vastly improving productivity and ACTUALLY PUSHING MANY TRANSIT ROUTES INTO THE BLACK.

This point is critical: the strategic provision of grade-separated infrastructure resulted in massive ridership gains AND very significant reductions in operating costs (subsidies) per passenger--the very "sweet spot" we need to be aiming at.

So, in conclusion, I'd like to encourage everyone to read the report and consider its primary finding: Quickways impose a very different logic on transit service planning, and we should not begin by limiting ourselves because of the fear of what any particular piece of a system might cost. As the appendix on San Diego makes clear, an intelligently-designed Quickway network is no more expensive to build than most regions' already-adopted transit plans, and may produce greater results for that investment.

Question: why a grade sep for a BRT? What's wrong with signal preemption? As for preventing pedestrians from crossing, I'm not sure that's desirable, cost-effective, or necessary. But maybe then I can be accused of pushing BRT lite?

I can't believe I just used an emoticon. Please don't tell anyone.

This is not true, especially if people can move quickly on their own.

Back in the day, when street transit ran on rails, the opposite was true, with streetcars running on local streets in low-traffic areas and then merging into a subway in congested areas downtown, as in Newark, Boston, San Francisco, and many cities in Europe.

BRT won't get crossing gates like a train does, but some BRT does have signal preemption, which lets it extend the green or turn the red green as the bus approaches in intersection.

The problem with buses instead of rail in Staten Island is that, when you have this high a volume of passengers, buses have a much higher operating cost. Labor is about 80% of the operating costs of buses. With rail, you can string together cars, so you need fewer drivers per passenger, lowering labor cost.

http://www.nctr.usf.edu/jpt/pdf/JPT%2010-1%20Stanger.pdf

"The new 14.2-mile Orange Line Busway opened in October 2005. Many aspects of the Orange Line’s design should be copied elsewhere: its attractive guideway and stations, state-of-the-art buses, proof-of-payment fare collection, and well-done environmental
mitigations. On the other hand, a typical Orange Line bus trip catches about 11 red lights and waits up to nine minutes for them to change. Its end-to-end travel speed is 20 mph. The travel time is also compromised by a 25 mph speed restriction at all intersections and speed limits along other portions of the busway."

"The lesson of the Orange Line to transit planners is that an at-grade busway will almost certainly not get signal preemption. This means it will not have the crossing gates that allow its buses to cross intersections at speed. Therefore, every other effort
should be made to increase a busway’s travel speed through off-board fare collection, well-located platforms, minimal speed restrictions, and quick transferring to connecting
services. A busway will be less expensive to build than a light rail alternative, but without signal preemption its travel speed will be significantly less."

No sense arguing about the SIR because it isn't going to happen, but yes the ROW is nearly wide enough, although stations would have had to be rebuilt to allow local buses to pull aside allowing express buses through. Forty buses per hour is not that many. Just stand over a highway overpass and wait 90 seconds while imagining how many buses could go through.

What would have had to happen is the entire SI bus route would have had to be reorgainized around the busway, with local buses ridding along the streets and then getting down on the busway and running express to St. George or the VB, in addition to those serving "stations" on the route. The ability to accomodate this mixed service is what a busway can do that light rail cannot.