Let's multiply that $500 as Shoup suggested times 150,000 parking permit holders in NYC. That's $7.5-million per month, or $90-million a year. Hmmm... and this guy Shoup was formerly an economist?

"...city parking permits -- a long abused system that lacks accountability. He says New York City employees [with parking permits] are three times more likely to drive to work."

In Chinatown, "No Permit Parking" signs, printed on paper, have reduced illegal permit abuse by at least 75% on a daily basis; sometimes illegal permit abuse is reduced even more - 85-90%. (Of course, this is maintained with some towing on occasion). I know this for a fact because I personally count the cars parked illegally on my block everyday when I walk my dog. No Permit Parking signs have no doubt altered the quality of life in Chinatown for the better - and, the City is making money on all the metered parking spots in Chinatown that were formerly taken all day by government sector commuters.

Cheap tin rider tags, posted signs that say "No Permit Parking" are a one-time expense that would reap millions ($46-million/year) in parking meter revenue alone for NYC; and, No Permit Parking signs would reduce the number of cars in NYC by many, and I mean many, thousands of cars every working day.

It seems that posting No Permit Parking signs would be a better one-time investment, rather than forking over $500 every month to bribe permit abusers who have chronically broken the law. Does Shoup really think his idea is good for NYC?

JF - I think I've located our point of departure.

That wasn't me, it was JK. But since you mentioned me, I'll comment.

Our problem is not knowing whether we're setting the meters to maximize turnover and revenue, or minimize VMT.

I think you've distilled your point to its essence here. This is a very important insight, and you've shown several hypothetical situations where maximizing turnover can increase VMT.

I would say in addition to minimizing VMT, we need to think about a couple of other criteria:

1. Minimize car ownership. This is not necessarily the same as minimizing VMT, but it's important. Does just owning a car change people's political behavior, making it more difficult to fund transit and implement pedestrian safety features? If, by making it more difficult to store a car on the street, we got all the "weekend escapees" to switch to Metro-North and Zipcar, and all the social drivers to switch to cabs, would that increase support for transit? Maybe it'll turn out not relevant, but it's worth looking at.

2. JK writes "The amount of curb parking is fixed." In practice, maybe, but if the political will is there the DOT can always reduce it, such as for the chicanery proposed for West 81st street in this video. One obstacle to many of these proposals is complaints about parking being taken away. Well, what if we take out parking spots but raise the rates so that drivers will still be able to find spots when they need them?

Finally, some of you probably remember that there's another Shoop Shoop Song. I chose the Aretha Franklin version because I couldn't find a video of Betty Everett. In any case, I just love the line "Oh no, that's not the way, and you're not listening to a word I say!" It perfectly captures the way I feel talking to some people about parking.

Hilary: as I said above, I am assuming that the pricing applies only to metered spaces. I think it would be a disaster if it also applied to spaces that currently aren't metered, for just the reason you say: they turn over maybe once or twice a week now, and with Shoupian pricing, they would turn over many times each day.

So, when I said one-third, I was assuming that maybe the average meter is occupied for 45 minutes now and would be occupied for 15 minutes with Shoupian parking.

One-third is just a figure I pulled out of the air to show that increased turnover could conceivably outweigh decreased cruising. How much turnover would increase is really an empirical question that, as far as I know, Shoup has not modelled.

Angus: the question is what pricing does in terms of trip generation. Eliminating double parking would reduce trip generation, but I haven't mentioned it because I think it is minor compared with increased turnover, even though it looks very impressive in a photograph. Again, this is an empirical question, and we don't know the answers about how much turnover would increase and double parking would decrease.

J:Lai, you are exactly right when you say:
"If the goal is to reduce overall demand for private car use, then the increase in parking cost has to be large enough that the marginal user will see the explicit cost as higher than the implied savings gained from easier access to on-street parking."

Unfortunately, this is not what Shoupian pricing does. Shoup sets the price to get a vacancy rate of 15%, regardless of how this price affects overall automobile use.

Incidentally, I think there would be a huge increase in driving to pick up take-out food with Shoupian pricing in Manhattan. My sister lives in Bronxville, in an apartment building with parking, and she thinks nothing of driving four blocks to pick up sandwiches at the deli. People don't do that in Manhattan because it takes too long to find parking near the deli. But if there were Shoupian pricing and several spaces open on the same block as the deli, people in Manhattan with parking garages in their buildings would sometimes drive the four blocks to the deli instead of walking. And once you are driving, why go only four blocks to the neighborhood deli? It is just as easy to drive a mile or two to some other take-out restaurant.

"Using a curb parking occupancy target of 85%(about one spot a block free) doesnt "create more parking." The amount of curb parking is fixed."

I would say the occupancy target of 85% DOES create more parking because I am defining "parking" as "putting your car into a parking spot." The Shoupian model considers parking to be the act of storing the car. So under Shoup, the parking is fixed. Under my definition, it increases according to the rate of turnover.

Our problem is not knowing whether we're setting the meters to maximize turnover and revenue, or minimize VMT.

Shoup has a great picture of Grosvenor Square in London before and after parking pricing in 1965. Before, it is jammed with double parked Rolls Royce. After, they are gone --- though meter rates there weren't that high.

I found it, John. It's slide #25 on this presentation:

http://www.trb.org/Conferences/RoadPricing/Presentations/Shoup.ppt

Charles, I think you are really underestimating the occupancy rate at 1/3. On an unmetered street in midtown or the upper west side now, the turnover is little more than 1-2 per WEEK, for alternate side parking. Also, the calculation for turnover with 15% vacancy doesn't mean that one space is turning over; that 15% lubricates ALL spaces to turn. The increase in VMT would be exponential, not linear. Shoup may be a fine urban planner and sociologist, but he's not a mathematician.

JK, I was using Carnegie Hall as an extreme example. In other places, there clearly not be as much turnover as at Carnegie Hall, but there will be more turnover than there currently is; the increased turnover is a major point that Shoup himself makes.

So lets say that Shoupian pricing eliminates cruising, reducing driving by 30% (midrange of your estimates). At the same time, let's say Shoupian pricing cuts the average time that a space is occupied to one-third of what it was with existing pricing. In this imaginary example, increased VMT because of increased turnover will outweigh decreased VMT because of decreased cruising, and overall VMT will increase.

My point is that we have rough figures about decreased cruising, but we don't have figures about increased turnover, so we don't know which will have a greater effect, and we don't know the net effect of Shoupian pricing on VMT.

I don't think LA is a good comparison, because LA was famously built around the automobile and it has more parking than Manhattan. In Manhattan, Shoupian pricing will raise the price of parking higher than in LA, and so it will cause higher turnover than in LA.

I have not seen information on higher pricing for parking in dense London boroughs, which you mention, JK. That sounds like a better comparison than LA, and if you could give more info about that, you might convince me. But remember that we are talking about Shoupian parking pricing, not about London's congestion pricing. (I am all for congestion pricing.)

vmn writes:
"All these new drivers, where will they be driving to once they're done parking? If curbside parking is now more expensive, they won't be able to find a cheap destination"

vmn, we are talking about people who drive into Manhattan from somewhere where they have a guaranteed parking space. This could be someone who lives in an upper-east-side apartment building with a garage, someone who lives in Westchester or Queens and has a driveway next to his house, etc. If it is easy to find a parking space right in front of Zabars, then those people will drive to Zabars, park in front for four minutes while they pick up lox and bagels, and then drive back home to eat the lox and bagels. (Zabars, like Carnegie Hall, is an extreme example meant to make a point about increased turnover that applies more generally.)

By definition, Shoupian pricing is the price level where 85% of all spaces are full. So, if there are not enough people to fill 85% of the spaces, then the price will be lowered until 85% of the spaces are filled.

The only question is what this target level of 85% does to turnover. In Manhattan, there is such a limited supply of parking and such great demand for parking, that we can expect a very high price for parking and a very high turnover - which means that we can expect lots more trips.

All these new drivers, where will they be driving to once they're done parking? If curbside parking is now more expensive, they won't be able to find a cheap destination.

There are a number of costs associated with operating a motor vehicle, of which parking is a big one. The more you raise those costs, the more you discourage the use and ownership of cars.

I grew up in Metro-North land, but we frequently drove 50 miles into the city because we studied the math. With free parking, the train was more expensive on a per-trip basis. For the sake of our nation and our planet, that disparity needs to be reversed. Best to do it with a combination of Shoupian parking policy and Bloombergian congestion pricing.

Increasing the cost of private car use (by increasing the cost on one component, parking) will decrease the demand.
However, by making parking easier to find, the "hidden" cost in time and effort to find a space will decrease.
There is some price level at which the decrease in the "hidden" cost will offset the explicit cost of parking, and therefore have neutral or possibly even positive impact on demand for private cars.

However, it is generally conceded that "cruising" can only be reduced as the price of on-street parking increases, so this externality will be reduced (a good thing for everyone.)

If the goal is to reduce cruising, then probably any increase in the cost of on-street parking is positive.

If the goal is to reduce overall demand for private car use, then the increase in parking cost has to be large enough that the marginal user will see the explicit cost as higher than the implied savings gained from easier access to on-street parking.

Users of private garages or other parking facilities will not be affected.

Here's a target: I want streets that my 8 year old can bike safely without being doored or hit by a truck; where my 2 year old might slip away from my hand and not be in danger of immediate death; where local cafes have room for outdoor tables; where parents with strollers can walk two abreast and not block the sidewalks.

Jonathon: almost all of us make decisions which are not financially viable, and it ain't nobody's business if we do! All I am saying is that, financially, you are probably better off not owning a car and taking cabs/renting cars whenever you like. No offense!