It sure sounds good to say "make the corporations pay", but it doesn't really mean anything, because no matter how you tax them, the added costs will in fact be passed on to consumers -- unless you add in price ceilings, but one need only look at Zimbabwe to see why that's a bad idea.

It doesn't (or shouldn't) really matter where you apply a tax on an economic transaction; the result will be to reduce the frequency of that transaction, to the detriment of all participants --- but possibly to the advantage of anyone experiencing a market congeniality.

You spoke in generalities and so I'm forced to do so in return, but if you're willing to drop the paternal attitude and make a concrete proposal I'd at least be willing to discuss it.

That's because right now the price of oil and gas is high enough to encourage conservation, alternative energy, and additional oil and gas exploration. But (as in the past) if the demand for oil and gas drops the price will plunge, and anyone who invests in conservation, alternative energy or even more oil and gas exploration will be the loser.

What we need is for the federal government to impose a tax on 90% of the savings from importing or producing oil for less than, say, $75 per barrel, and it's gas equivalent, adjusted upward for inflation, with a 30-year sunset provision.

Thus, the government would NOT be increasing the cost to the consumer from what it is today. It would just be guaranteeing the cost would not fall. The (future) President could point out that we are over an economic and foreign policy barrel (forget the environment) because every time the price of energy goes down, Americans take the lazy, easy, stupid way out. So let's not do this again.

Politically, this proposal would be in the interest of states supporting conservation, solar, ethanol, AND expensive domestic oil and gas exploration (for the refiner and marketer, the imported supply net of tax would be little cheaper than drilling here).

The only battle, and the only solely environmental (rather than economic or foreign policy) objective, would involve coal, since coal is cheap and domestic and putting in a BTU-equivalent tax would raise the price of electricity in dirty states. This could be offset by remitting to the coal consumer parts of the tax in proportion to the extent to which pollution controls prevent pollution and carbon from getting in the air.

I'de prefer to share my opinion

* NO on “car tax” AB118 (Nunez)

* NO on AB616 (Jones) unless amended

* NO on SB23 (Cogdill) unless amended

* Clean Air Performance Professionals (CAPP) supports a Smog Check inspection & repair audit, gasoline oxygen cap and elimination of dual fuel CAFÉ credit to cut car impact over 50% in 1 year.

* Some folks believe corn ethanol in gasoline increases oil use and oil profit

* Ethanol uses lots of water

* A Smog Check audit would cut toxic car impact in ½ in 1 year. Chief Sherry Mehl, DCA/BAR, has never found out if what is broken on a Smog Check failed car gets fixed, never

* A corn ethanol waiver would stop a $1 billion California oil refinery welfare program coming from the federal government @ $0.51 per gallon of ethanol used

* About 60,000 barrels per day of the oil used by cars is allowed by the "renewable fuel" CAFE credit

Clean Air Performance Professionals

The differences between cap-and-trade and a carbon tax shift are:

In cap-and-trade, the caps are subject to political pressure. As a result, Europe set its caps so low that its cap-and-trade has little effect. Instead, we should have a carbon tax that increases each year, without being subject to these political pressures.

With cap-and-trade, the higher prices that people pay are given to businesses that do more to reduce emissions, who sell credits to other businesses. With a carbon tax shift, the higher prices are given back to everyone equally in the form of tax rebates.

The pro-business bias is why most politicians support cap-and-trade. If we emphasized the fact that cap-and-trade gives the money to businesses and a carbon tax shift gives the money to all taxpayers, then we could build broad public support for a carbon tax shift.

These issues aside, there are a few minor differences between carbon taxation and cap-and-trade systems:
1) Carbon taxation makes it much easier for industry planners to predict the future price of carbon. Since tax rates will be less volatile than the price of pollution permits, it makes it easier for example for a utility company to build a new natural gas plant over coal-fired with the knowledge that the price difference will be the same in several years.
2) Cap-and-trade, on the other hand, guarantees a particular level of emissions, which is important from an environmental perspective. Unless the carbon tax is set higher than the cost of carbon sequestration under current technologies, it's possible that the tax would have to be raised or environmental needs compromised.

The main things to look for in carbon legislation, though are completely unrelated to the trade vs cap debate, and are:
1) A regulatory trial that lasts a long time -- at least 15 years -- to ensure that the regime can affect long-term capital investments.
2) Open regulations that do not discriminate based on the pollution source (e.g., coal carbon emissions should be taxed/capped to the same degree as truck carbon emissions)
3) Any assistance offered to those affected by carbon regulations should be made directly to the affected individuals, on a needs-tested basis, and not in cash. No corporate handouts should accompany the scheme in any form.

Sadly, I expect all three of these criteria to be compromised in any federal regime. These are the things nobody is talking about (because they create clear losers) but failure in these areas will likely result in a carbon regulation scheme that, much like our tax and campaign finance regulations, is broken by design.